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Law and Religion in Contemporary Islam
By NOEL J. COULSON*
Introduction
SHE LAWS THAT GOVERN contemporary Muslim society
are extremely complex, not merely because of the vast geo-
graphical expanse and the great number of Muslim countries
and communities, but more particularly because of the radical con-
fficts and tensions between different standards and ideologies that are
the formative elements of the Islamic legal systems. Accordingly,
analytical studies tend to dissect the Islamic legal system into its
various components. The most recent and exhaustive survey of the
philosophy and effects of modern law reform in Islam' consistently
divides the system in terms of the conflicts and tensions between
several coexisting ideologies. This examination focuses on conflicts
and tension between the traditionalist and the modernist approach,
the theoretical doctrine and the actual legal practice, Islamic and
Western values, and religious and secularist attitudes. Although any
scholarly appreciation of current Islamic law necessarily involves the
use of these polarities, the nonspecialist needs to be aware of two
principal dangers. First, undue emphasis upon the heterogeneous
nature of the different components of Islamic law may obscure the
fundamental unity of the system. The distinction between two con-
flicting elements may be drawn too rigidly; it may be represented as
either black or white when it should be viewed as a linear scale with
black and white as its opposite extremities and varying shades of gray
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rister-at-Law of Gray's Inn. Dean of the Faculty of Law, Ahmadu Bello University,
Nigeria, 1965-66. Visiting Professor at U.C.L.A., 1961 and 1977, at the University
of Chicago, 1967, at the University of Pennsylvania, 1970 and at the University of
Utah, 1977. Author, A History of Islamic Law, 1964, Conflicts and Tensions in Islamic
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as the great mass of the intermediate area. Second, each of the po-
larities may be regarded as an expression of one aspect of the para-
mount conflict between the religious and the secular approach to law.
Traditional or orthodox doctrine, however, is not exclusively religious,
nor is modem or Western legal practice necessarily secular.
In this last respect, the most crucial division within modem Is-
lamic legal systems is generally regarded as that between the family
law, which is Islamic and therefore religious, and the general civil
and criminal law, which is western in inspiration and expression and
therefore secular. By suggesting on the basis of historical precedent
and current Islamic jurisprudential thought that this division is not
rigid and clearcut, this Article will endeavor to suggest the correct
perspective with which to view the relationship of law and religion
in present day Islam.
The Shari 'a Doctrine
Until relatively recent times, western oriental scholars derived
their notion of law in Islam from the manuals of Shari'a law.2 This
extensive body of Arabic literature dating from early medieval times
was the only recognized literature on Islamic law. Enshrined in
these Shari'a manuals is the purist doctrine of Islamic law as devel-
oped by the scholar-jurists. The code of conduct formulated by
these manuals covers in meticulous detail every aspect of human be-
havior known to the scholar-jurists, from dietary rules to the criminal
sanctions for highway robbery and from commercial contracts to the
system of succession at death. The code provides for every detail
of a person's activities, public or private, social or individual, and
adherence to its provisions is required of all Muslims as an expression
of their religious faith.
Shari'a law represented the command of Allah for Muslim society.
Legal theorists ascertained that the Shari'a was based upon the ex-
pression of Allah's will contained in the Qur'an 3 and the divinely
inspired precedents of behaviour of the Prophet Muhammad (sunna).
Principles derived from these sources were extended by juristic reas-
2. These Arabic texts are collected in J. SC HACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC
LAW 215-85 (1964) (bibliography) [hereinafter cited as SCHACHT].
3. The Qur'an is the Moslems' book of God. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 5. The
Qur'an is but one of the four major roots of Shari'a. Id. at 6.
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oning (iftihad) and used to regulate the whole field of human rela-
tionships. The validity of the total scheme as the expression of Allah's
command was guaranteed by the infallible consensus of the scholars
(ijma'). Thus, the fusion of law and religion is complete within
the Shai'a texts. The external conduct of Muslim society, in every
aspect, is the expression of its inner spiritual belief.
Three principal claims for the system known as Shari'a law were
made by the scholar-jurists. First, the system was comprehensive,
covering every eventuality and type of conduct. Second, it was the
exclusive system for defining the Muslim State and society and for
commanding the total allegiance of all Muslims. Third, the system
was immutable, stamped with the seal of the infallible consensus
(i/ma') as the final and perfect expression of the divine will.
Shari'a doctrine, both legal theory and substantive law, was the
work of idealist scholars. Far from merely documenting existing
legal practice, it was at the outset a system elaborated essentially in
opposition to that practice. The doctrine was an alternative scheme
designed to represent the true translation of the religious ethic of
Islam into rules of actual conduct. Initially it developed without
official government activities or sponsorship. Later, however, Islamic
governments supported its development and application with vary-
ing amounts of zeal. How ever great might be the influence that the
Shari'a was later to achieve, this influence was not the result of any
unequivocal directive of divine revelation. The fundamental prin-
ciples of the Shari'a doctrine were essentially self-asserted principles
from the ivory tower of academic idealism, the result of juristic spec-
ulation (ijtihad) over minimal amount of divine revelation, and con-
secration of the results by the consensus (ima') .4
At the time it was created, therefore, Shari'a doctrine was merely
one ingredient of the law in Islam. The other ingredient was the
law applied by the courts in actual practice. This dichotomy con-
tinued throughout the centuries to be the central feature of Islamic
legal systems. As a result, legal history is largely an account of the
extent to which the Shari'a law, over the course of time, succeeded
in supplanting the legal practice for which it was originally to be an
alternative. The Shari'a, however, has never been the exclusive sys-
tem of Islamic law as claimed by the scholar-jurists.
4. Coulson, Doctrine and Practice in Islamic Law, in BULLETIN OF THE SCHOOL
OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES (BSOAS) (1956).
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Shari 'a Doctrine and the Court System
The Shari'a law was applied in the qadis' courts which were
traditionally bound to apply only the doctrine of the Shari'a manuals.
The qadis' courts were not the only law courts of the Muslim com-
munities, but the extent of the "non-Shari'a" courts' jurisdiction is
not easily defined because of the lack of relevant unbiased contem-
porary documentation. As noted above,a the proponents of Shari'a
doctrine gained a monopoly over legal literature, and their writings
referred to the non-Shari'a jurisdictions only in general and hostile
terms.6 Nevertheless, other sources reveal that non-Shari'a courts
had broad jurisdiction over criminal and commercial law matters.
The governmental justification, indeed the necessity, for the non-
Sharj'a courts was essentially procedural. Shari'a courts were bound
by their own rigid system of procedure and evidence. Under that
system, the burden of proof could be discharged only by two trust-
worthy witnesses testifying orally to the facts in issue. Circumstan-
tial evidence, however compelling, was inadmissible, and if the proper
testimony was not produced by the prosecution or the plaintiff, the
defendant's solemn religious oath of denial would secure judgment
in defendant's favor. The effective administration of justice in crim-
inal and commercial matters required a more flexible system of evi-
dence and procedure, and the only way for the government to achieve
that goal was through non-Shari'a jurisdictions.
These courts did not necessarily apply a substantive law wholly
alien to Shari'a doctrine, although at certain times and in certain
places they may have done so. For example, some Islamic tribunals
applied law customary in the field of family law to cases based on
the traditional law of the tribunal's locality, even though it diverged
radically from Shari'a doctrine.7 In addition, commercial tribunals,
from medieval times, have developed and applied a system of legal
devices designed to protect trading activities from the stultifying in-
fluence of the Shari'a prohibitions against any form of interest on
capital loans and speculative transactions in general (riba).s
5. See text accompanying note 4, supra.
6. See SCHACHT, supra note 2, at 85.
7. See particularly the works of the Fernch Orientalist, G.-H. Bousquet (quoted
in ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 10-13 n.13).
8. SCHACHT, supra note 2, at 78-85.
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These examples illustrate extreme cases deviating from the gen-
eral rule that substantive Shari'a doctrine was recognized and applied
in non-Shara jurisdictions whenever possible and practical. Even-
tually the scholar-jurists recognized the legitimacy of the non-Shari'a
tribunals under the broad doctrine of siyasa, the principle that the
Ruler has the right, or more properly the duty, to provide for the ef-
fective administration of law in the public interest (maslaha) by or-
ganizing, where necessary, jurisdictions alternative to the Shari'a
courts. The siyasa doctrine ultimately rests upon the text of the
Qur'an itself: "Obey Allah, His prophet and those at the head of
your affairs."
Shar 'a Doctrine Today
History thus reveals the Islamic legal system to be an amalgam
of Shari'a law and various alternative jurisdictions, which will here-
after be referred to as the Ruler's law. From the purist scholar's
point of view, the non-Shari'a jurisdictions may have appeared as a
reluctant concession to practical necessity, but from a realist and offi-
cial standpoint, both components of the system were equally Islamic.
The latter view regarded the whole system, not only the Shari'a
courts, as a system of religious law, organized and applied by Muslim
rulers and judges for their Muslim communities.
There is little doubt that today the purist Shari'a doctrine plays
a much smaller role in the Islamic legal system than at any previous
time. No longer can any realistic claim be made that the SharI'a
represents the comprehensive, exclusive, and immutable system de-
scribed by the medieval scholars.
Today material and organizational circumstances exist which lie
wholly outside the purview of the medieval legal manuals, belying
any claim to comprehensiveness. Limited attempts were made, par-
ticularly in conservative Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and
the Gulf States, to classify such modem phenomena as telecommuni-
cations, air freight, and oil exploitation within broadly parallel situ-
ations known to and regulated by the medieval authorities. For
example, air freight was analogized to carriage of goods by camel
so that the rules concerning such carriage could be applied. Such
attempts to retain the Shari'a claim of comprehensiveness, however,
had an air of unreality bordering on desperation. Finally, it became
apparent that the only practical way to deal with modem Western
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civilization was to adopt rules and regulations based on Western
models.9 Accordingly, recent years have witnessed the proliferation
of legislation in most Muslim countries, including labor regulations
and traffic laws.
These developments entailed an expansion of the non-Shari'a
jurisdictions which effectively undermined the purist claim that Shari'a
doctrine was exclusively applied in Muslim society. By the end of
the nineteenth century, new court systems fashioned after Western
models were applying Western-inspired codes of criminal, commer-
cial, and general civil law as a matter of established and accepted
Islamic law. By this time Shari'a doctrine, as applied in the qadis'
courts, was confined to family law matters. Developments in family
law during the present century, moreover, firmly and finally repudi-
ate the last major claim of the purists-the claim that Shari'a doctrine
as recorded in the medieval legal manuals was fixed and immutable
as the perfect expression of an eternally valid code of conduct.
The most notable developments in the family law sphere of
Islamic tradition have affected the legal status of polygamy and talaq
(divorce by a husband's unilateral repudiation of his marriage), two
institutions historically regarded as the hallmarks of the patriarchal
Islamic family. Today, polygamy is prohibited in Turkey and Tu-
nisia and among the Ismaili communities of East Africa. 10 Other
Muslim countries require a husband to obtain court or other official
permission prior to marrying a second or further wife." The prin-
cipal effect of this reform is to entitle the wife of a polygamous
husband who has flouted the law to a dissolution of her marriage.
Indeed, in Morocco and Iran she may obtain such relief whether or
not the husband's other marriage was duly authorized.
The vesting of the courts with broad discretion in their consid-
eration of the propriety of a polygamous union was motivated by
legislative concern for the feelings of women in general, and the first
wife in particular. This shift in focus by the traditionally patriarchal
9. See ARBITRATION BETWEEN THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA AND
ARABIAN AMIERICAN OIL COMIPANY, FINAL MEMORIAL OF ARABIAN AMERICAN OIL COI-
PANY 360-64 (1956).
10. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 110-11; N. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMtIC LA\W
210, 215-16 (1964) [hereinafter cited as COULSON].
11. Such permission, granted with regard to varying criteria, is required in Iran,
Iraq, Morocco, Pakistan, Singapore, Somalia, South Yemen, and Syria. ANDERSON.,
supra note 1, at 112-14; COULSON, supra note 10, at 207-15.
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Muslim society is indicative of the ultimate disappearance of the
traditional male perogative of polygamy.
Developments in the law of divorce are even more profound.
A husband's power to terminate his marriage unilaterally, by talaq,
was made subject to court scrutiny. In the event of a judicial find-
ing that no proper motive for repudiation existed, the court could
award compensation to the wife. A correlative trend expanded a
wife's ability to obtain dissolution of her marriage. These two de-
velopments have represented complete reform in Iran, Somalia, and
South Yemen. Those countries recognize only those divorces ob-
tained by court decree, and the grounds for a divorce are the same
whether the husband or the wife is the petitioner.
Although not as well developed, the same divorce system exists
in other Muslim countries. In Tunisia and Pakistan, for example, a
husband who insists upon his right to terminate the marriage by talaq
may do so provided he observes certain formal requirements and ful-
fills any necessary conditions. In Pakistan he must give notice to a
properly constituted Arbitration Council, and in Tunisia, apart from
obtaining the court's decree, he must pay such compensation to the
wife as the court decrees. In this regard, Tunisian legislation has
given the wife a position of exact parity with her husband, but ju-
dicial decisions in Pakistan have firmly established the principle that
a wife's right to judicial dissolution of her marriage is contingent upon
the return to her husband of the dower she received in consideration
of her marriage.
In sum, there has developed in Muslim countries a philosophy
that accepts divorce as a solution to the irreconcilable breakdown
of marriage, including the case in which either spouse insists uni-
laterally upon ending the union. Although talaq and the conditions
under which it may be effective are still discussed in legal circles,
the very essence of the traditional institution of talaq as the discre-
tionary right of the husband alone has been overwhelmed and sub-
merged by the modern reforms.
Shari 'a Doctrine and General Islamic Jurisprudence
Paralleling the radical changes in substantive family law, and
perhaps even surpassing them in significance, are those changes that
have occurred in general Islamic jurisprudential theory. According
July 1978] CONTEMPORARY ISLAM
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to traditional Shari'a legal theory, each and every detail of the law
represents the divine will. This theory is true, however, only to the
extent the law is based directly upon some text of divine revelation
or is derived by analogy to such a text. Because of this traditional
ideology, attempts were made in the early stages of family law re-
form to justify the changes as interpretations of divine revelation.
Thus, the various changes relating to polygamy were explained as
a new, more restrictive interpretation of the Qur'anic verse to the
effect that Muslims should take only one wife if a plurality of wives
may possibly result in unequal treatment among them. Similarly,
explanatory memoranda accompanying legislative reforms in the law
of divorce referred repeatedly to the implications to be drawn from
the verses of the Qur'an, which state that wives should be "retained
with kindness or released with consideration," and from the well
known saying of the prophet, "of all things permissible, repudiation
(talaq) is the most abominable."' 2
Gradually, this concern with the reconciliation of reform with
traditional purist Shari'a legal theory has become less important. So-
cial desirability in itself has been increasingly recognized as a proper
and sufficient reason for reform. Indeed, the preamble to an impor-
tant reform on the law of bequests, introduced into the Sudan in
1945, states that the reform was adopted simply because the people
were in need of it.13
There is much support for the view that, from the very begin-
ning of the reform movement, social desirability had always been
its real impetus and that presentation of the reforms in the garb of
traditional jurisprudential principles was formal window-dressing to
placate conservative religious sentiment. 14  In any event, an immense
difference exists between contemporary and traditional legal theory.
The law is still, as it always must be for the Muslim, Allah's command
for Muslim society. Whereas in the past the religious law was iden-
tified with explicit statements of divine revelation, however, today
the concept of what constitutes the will of Allah is much less rigid.
The Islamic law certainly no longer is seen as a code of conduct
that is eternally valid and therefore immutable. The restrictions on
12. COULSON, supra note 10, at 217.
13. For the full text of the Judicial Circular that introduced the reform, see COUL-
SON, SuccEsSIoN IN THE MUSLIM FA-MILY 255 (1971).
14. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 75.
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polygamy and talaq today are regarded as a legitimate expression
of the religious law, and those restrictions are based upon social de-
sirability as conceived by the reformers. Thus, current Islamic ju-
risprudence must rest upon the notion that the Islamic community,
through its governmental administration, will ultimately order its
affairs in conformity with the divine will. The notion of a divinely
ordained law, therefore, is now replaced by that of a divinely guided
society. Although it may seem to be the height of paradox to any
student of Western legal theory, contemporary Islamic jurisprudence
appears to be moving toward a theory of a natural religious law.
The question arises whether there is a fundamental difference
of philosophy, within Islamic jurisprudence, between family law on
the one hand and criminal and commercial law on the other. Both
legal fields have adopted new standards of conduct that originated
outside Islam.15 Whether the new standards are borrowed directly
from relevant Western laws or whether they are formally represented
as a new interpretation and modern version of Shari'a law seems to
be of comparatively minor significance. Regardless of origin and
field of legal application, these standards have become an integral
part of the legal system followed in tle Muslim countries today.
The totality of the system within any given national boundary is
what constitutes "Islamic law."
Conclusion
Today, as has always been the case, Islamic law is a compound
system. In the earliest stages of legal development in Islam, the
scholar-jurists interpreted the divine revelation according to the cir-
cumstances existing in their own geographical locality, while the
rulers adopted, to the degree they found necessary, foreign legal in-
stitutions from the territories conquered outside Arabia. During this
process, usually referred to as the "Islamization" of the law, the whole
legal system rested firmly on a religious basis. It continues to do
so today because it is a system of law promulgated and applied by
the recognized authorities of a Muslim State for the Muslim popula-
tion it serves and embraces.
15. Marxist doctrines, for example, are now represented as "not inconsistent with
Islamic Shari'a" and they have given a unique flavor to the new Family Law in the
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Law No. I of 1974). See GHANE.M 3 ARA-
BL.x S'rTnms 191-96 (1976).
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To identify Islamic law with the traditional Shari'a, as the pure
theorists did, is a cardinal error that leads to the categorization of
any law not within the traditional Shari'a as non-Islamic or secular.
The Shari'a has, however, never been synonymous with Islamic law,
and now it is even less so.
Certainly, the traditional Shari'a doctrine forms a proper and a
convenient focal point from which to assess the nature of any Islamic
legal system, and perhaps the simplest distinction apparent within
the system is the one between theory and practice. Theory is rep-
resented by the traditional Shari'a doctrine, and practice is repre-
sented by any other rules or institutions that are recognized and ap-
plied by he courts. As Schacht says, however:
We must think of the relationship of theory and practice in Is-
lamic law not as a clear division of spheres but as one of inter-
action and mutual interference, a relationship in which the theory
showed a great assimilating power, the power of imposing its
spiritual ascendancy even when it could not control the material
conditions.16
A good example of such interaction in contemporary Islam is
the present legal system of Saudi Arabia. Today the Shari'a courts
in Saudi Arabia have general jurisdiction, but a fairly extensive sys-
tem of supplementary jurisdictions also exists. The committees for
the settlement of commercial disputes at Riyadh, Jeddah, and Dam-
man were created by a decision of the Saudi Council of Ministers in
1967. Initially, these committees were staffed at least in part by
commercial experts, but they now consist only of two experts in
Shari'a law. Furthermore, even though committees should apply
only the procedures outlined in the Commercial Law of 1931, they
also apply traditional Shari'a rules of procedure and evidence.17 Un-
der these circumstances, traditional and modern substantive laws and
procedures have become so closely interwoven that they are now in-
separable aspects of a legal system that has a profoundly religious
character.
Other Muslim governments are much more "progressive" than
the government of Saudi Arabia. In Egypt and Tunisia, for example,
the Shari'a courts as a separate entity have been abolished altogether.
Nevertheless, whatever the composition of their individual legal sys-
16. SCHACHT, supra note 2, at 84.
17. CouLsoN, supra note 10, at 154.
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tems in terms of traditional Shari'a and other elements, Muslim gov-
ernments today are becoming increasingly conscious of their Muslim
identity. They see themselves, as the Qur'anic phrase puts it, "at
the head of affairs" of a Muslim State and therefore bound to organ-
ize and administer a system of Islamic law.
Islamic law is no longer religious in the traditional Shari'a sense
that each and every detail of conduct is explicitly regulated by the
divine will. Islamic government and society, however, continue to
be based on the Qur'anic injunction to "obey Allah, his Prophet and
those at the head of your affairs." Thus, every existing Islamic legal
system is, by definition, a system of law based on religion.
From this standpoint, the current and continuing debate in Mus-
lim communities, as reflected in the wide variety of laws that govern
the lives of Muslims, may be seen quite simply in terms of an in-
ternal religious debate between conservative and modernist elements
and attitudes. The conflict is one which an outside observer must
recognize and may assess in terms of its legal results. The external
observer, however, is not qualified to decide whether one attitude
or the other is more or less "Islamic" or "religious." This question
is one that can be answered only by the Muslim religious conscience.
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